Although, at the start, the new European project provoked enormous enthusiasm among numerous intellectuals, statesmen and members of civil society, it still gave rise to many a fear. Some states refused to give up their hallowed sovereignty, unable to imagine submitting to a higher order, a supranational framework which might somehow limit their powers.
Thus, after a highly promising start, the various ideas as to what shape the European unification process should take started to clash.
Political crises and institutional blockages
Tensions between advocates of supranationalism and advocates of intergovernmentalism worsened in the mid-1960s. General de Gaulle supported sovereignty, refusing to concede even slightly to a supranational authority. He dreamed of a strong and independent France as the pillar of a European force equal to that of the United States.
From then on, tension started to build up between France and its European partners who were crying out for more supranationalism, so that the Common Market could take shape and develop. Faced with these repeated conflicts, the French representatives decided to stop sitting on the Council, thereby paralysing community activities.
This crisis, known as the 'empty chair’ crisis, ended in 1966 with the Luxembourg compromise, in which the Six agreed that each Member State could object to a Community decision passed by a majority, if they considered that it put national interests at serious risk.
In 1967, the Six merged the three executive bodies (the High Authority of the ECSC, the Commission of the EEC and the Commission of the EAEC) into a single body: the Commission of the European Communities. The Commission was given powers of initiative, execution and representation and was therefore a sort of embryo for a future Federal European government. The three Councils were also merged.
Gradually, the idea of democratising the European institutions also started to take hold and the European Parliamentary Assembly was thus to be renamed the European Parliament (EP). Even though it still did not have full legislative powers like the national parliaments, the powers of the EP gradually increased through custom during the 1960s and 1970s, and the first election of its members by direct universal suffrage was held in 1979.
Europe of the Twelve
Great Britain, which until then had been hostile to the process of European unification, started thinking about taking a more active role. At the end of the 1960s, the fear of seeing its sovereign powers dwindle was now triggering the fear of remaining isolated on the international stage and it understood the importance of participating in the EEC which, despite the crises that had marked it, had nonetheless been hailed a distinct success. It was now time to think about joining, especially as the new French head of state, Georges Pompidou, no longer opposed its accession in principle (unlike de Gaulle, who had vetoed it twice in the 1960s).
Accession negotiations thus started between the European Community and Great Britain, as well as with Denmark, Ireland and Norway, whose economies were still closely linked to the British market through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
On 1 January 1973, Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the European Community. Norway, on the other hand, was obliged to stay out following a ‘no’ vote in the referendum held in Norway.
In the 1980s, the Europe of the Nine enlarged southwards to the countries which now had democratic regimes, with Greece (1981), then Spain and Portugal (1986) joining the European Community to form the Europe of the Twelve.
As a result of these successive enlargements and changes in Community competences, the European leaders started to think about the need to reform the Community institutions and how they operated, especially since there had been a fairly significant increase in terms of numbers (there were many more commissioners, members, judges etc.).
This ‘increased complexity’ risked undermining the proper functioning of the European institutions and their decision-making abilities. Moreover, the risk of a legitimacy crisis in the process of European integration was growing, as was the risk that citizens would look on it as a fundamentally bureaucratic structure. The challenge now was to adapt the institutional architecture of Europe to the changes which it had undergone and the changes which awaited it…